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1 Introduction
Real Time Logic, RTL, was introduced by Jahanian and Mok in [5] as a formalism for reasoning about the
absolute timing properties of real-time systems. The need for RTL came from a perceived inextensibility
of research at that time from relative timing problems of systems to absolute timings. RTL is a rst order
logic with an uninterpreted predicate which relates events of a system to the time of their occurrence.
RTL assumes, as its model of time, a total order isomorphic to the natural numbers. In this paper we
provide extensions to RTL which allow reasoning about absolute timings for both continuous and discrete
time, and reasoning about system behaviour in the value and time domains by parametrising predicates
in terms of system variables. Incorporating these features into RTL we obtain Extended Real-Time Logic
(ERTL) which is suitable for the modelling and analysis of hybrid systems.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the concepts of an event-action model,
and discuss their formalisation in terms of RTL and ERTL. Section 3 denes the syntax and semantics
of ERTL. Section 4 presents two case studies, the rst is the traditional cat and mouse problem, and the
second concerns temperature control for a nuclear reactor by moving the reactor's rods. Finally, section
5 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Event-Action Model
The event-action model proposed by Jahanian and Mok captures the temporal ordering of computational
actions, and is based on events, actions, state predicates and timing constraints. Some of the concepts
on which the Jahanian and Mok event-action model is based were rst introduced by Heninger [4] as a
collection of concepts for specifying the software requirements of the operational ight program for the
A-7 aircraft.
The motivation in our work for selecting the concepts of the event-action model for conducting the
requirements analysis for hybrid systems is that they can be used to model system behaviour ranging
from the activities of the physical entities (which are part of the environment of the computing system)
to the temporal ordering of computational tasks [1, 2, 3]. However, to fully exploit the event-action
model in the continuous time domain, it is necessary to extend RTL (originally proposed to specify only
discrete aspects of system behaviour) to enable modelling and analysis of both discrete and continuous
aspects of system behaviour to be performed. An advantage of such an approach is that it allows the
modelling and analysis of the system and its environment using the same formal technique.
22.1 RTL as a Formaliser of the Event-Action Model
RTL was introduced in order to represent the event-action model concepts in a way which would allow the
formal analysis to be performed by mechanical manipulation. RTL is a rst order logic which captures
the notion of time through the occurrence function \@" by relating an event with its time of occurrence.
(In a subsequent publication [6], the occurrence function \@", which had time as a dependent variable,
was replaced by (Boolean) occurrence relation \" which has time as parameter; in the rest of this paper
we will be referring only to the later publication.) The properties that characterise the behaviour of a
particular system, are established from the subset of occurrence relations which provide models for that
system. Occurrence relations are characterised by the monotonicity axioms which state that:
i. the same occurrence of an event cannot happen at two distinct times;
ii. two distinct occurrences of the same event must happen ate dierent times.
2.2 Extended RTL as a Formaliser of the Event-Action Model
As an extension to RTL, the original motivation for the introduction of that formalism will carry over to
ERTL. This includes:
i. the ability to express the causal independence of subsystems which do not interact;
ii. the ability to express the interaction of systems through synchronous occurrence of events;
iii. the ability to express safety and liveness assumptions;
iv. the ability to express hard real time deadlines;
v the provision of notions for proof of satisfaction.
To these we will add the ability to describe the interactions of the whole system, which includes the
computing system and its environemnt, rather than just the computing systems.
The axiom system for ERTL is an expanded form of that for RTL. The formal demonstration of the
containment of RTL within ERTL is not dicult. The complexity of RTL is already suently high for
there to exist undecideable subsets. This result will, of course, transfer to ERTL.
This section presents an informal view of ERTL by comparing and contrasting its basic concepts with
those of RTL.
2.2.1 System Variables and System Predicates
A system variable holds the value of an attribute of a system. A system variable will, in general, vary
over time and so may be considered as time dependent. Unlike RTL, ERTL allows the representation of
system variables, supporting sophisticated reasoning techniques over the value domain.
In ERTL, a system predicate is a formulae over relational operators parameterised, in particular, by
system variables. As such, the evaluation of a system predicate may vary with the values of the system
variables which are its parameters, hence is also time dependent.
2.2.2 Events
An event denes and is dened by a point of the timeline. Intuitively, an event does not consume system
resources. The notion of an event is common to both RTL and ERTL.
The transition of a system predicate from false to true or from true to false at a particular time point
denes a transition event: given the system predicate P , the transitions events related to P are given by
%P and &P , respectively.
32.2.3 Actions
An action denes and is dened by a closed interval (a contiguous subset of the timeline) which is also
a non-singleton set. In particular, an action denes two events which are the rst and last points of
the dened interval which we call, respectively, the start and end events of the action. The duration of
an (occurrence of an) action is the length of the interval it denes. Intuitively, an action consumes a
bounded quantity of system resources. To be considered as consuming resources an action must be of
non-zero duration (hence it is a non-singleton interval).
2.2.4 Occurrence Relation
As time progresses we may reach a time point which an event denes. At this point the event is said to
occur. For an event e, the proposition that event e occurs at t is denoted (e; t). The proposition that
the i-th instance of an event e occurs at time t is denoted (e; i; t).  is called an occurrence relation.
An action is said to be in progress if its start event has occurred, but its end event has not yet occurred.
In progress may be translated into a proposition relating the time of start and end events through .
2.2.5 Holding Relation
A system predicate is said to hold at a time point when the values of the system variables evaluated at
that point in time and substituted for the corresponding system variables in the system predicate satisfy
the resulting formula. For a system predicate, f , the proposition that formula f holds at t is denoted
(f; t). The proposition that f holds for the i-th time at t is denoted by (f; i; t).  is called a holding
relation.
Notice that within any one occurrence of a holding relation all system variables are evaluated at the same
time point; for instance, it is not possible, within single propositions (f; t) or (f; i; t) to compare directly
the value of a system variable at two distinct time points: if Temp is a system variable representing the
temperature of some part of a real-time system, to ask whether Temp(5) = Temp(6) requires us to write
9u@(Temp = u; 5) ^ (Temp = u; 6).
3 ERTL: Syntax and Semantics
3.1 Syntax of ERTL
ERTL is a rst order logic,  , in which propositional variables are interpreted. The interpretation of a
propositional variable takes one of two forms:
 an instance of the occurrence relation,  , relating the events to the time points of their occurrence,
and
 an instance of the holding relation, , relating actions and system predicates to the time intervals
over which they hold.
As mentioned above, system predicates are predicates whose truth value varies over time. They form a
separate rst order logic,  , in which system variables may appear as ordinary variables. Formulae of 
may be embedded into  through their appearence as the rst operand of the holding relation. There is
a strong relationship between formulae of  and those of  which is characterised below.
The enclosing predicate calculus we call the outer calculus, the embedded predicate calculus we call the
inner calculus.
43.1.1 Syntax of the Inner Calculus
The inner calculus consists of the following symbols:
i. constants, such as 0 , 100 , Yes, ;
ii. time independent system variables, such as i , j ;
iii. time dependent system variables, such as CiTemp(t), PTemp(t);
iv. operations, such as +;
v. relations, including =, <, , >, ;
vi. event constants, such as BUTTON1 ,%(Temp > 5000 ), "CoDMovRods ;
vii. action constants, such as CoDMovRods.
The inner calculus consists of the following terms:
i. a constant is an inner term;
ii. a time independent system variable is an inner term;
iii. a time dependent system variable is an inner term;
iv. if tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
are inner terms and o is an operator of arity n, then o(tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
) is an inner term,
such as i + 1 , x + .
The inner calculus consists of the following formulae:
i. if tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
are inner terms and r is a relation of arity n, then r(tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
) is an inner formula,
such as Temp > 5 ;
ii. if p is an inner formula then so is :p, such as :Temp > 5 ;
iii. if p; q are inner formulae then so is p ^ q , such as Temp > j ^ j > 7 ;
iv. if p is an inner formula v a logical variable then 8v  p is an inner formula, such as 8j  Temp >
5 ) j > k .
An inner formula in which only time independent system variables appear is called a time independent
formula, and otherwise a time dependent formula.
The inner calculus has the following syntactic restrictions:
i. for an action constant a there are events "a; #a: the start and stop events of an action, and
ii. for an inner formula f there are transitions events %f ;&f : the start and stop transition events of
a formula.
3.1.2 Syntax of the Outer Calculus
The outer calculus consists of the following symbols:
i. constants,
ii. time independent system variables,
iii. time variables,
iv. operations,
5v. relations,
vi.  and .
The outer calculus consists of the following sub-propositions:
i. for e an event constant, i an integer and t a time variable, there are subpropositions (e; t) and
(e; i ; t);
ii. for a an action constant, i an integer and t a time variable there are subpropositions ("a; i ; t)
and (#a; i ; t);
iii. for f an inner formula, i an integer and t a time variable there are subpropositions (f ; t), (f ; i ; t),
(%f ; i ; t) and (&f ; i ; t).
The outer calculus consists of the following terms:
i. a constant is an outer term;
ii. a time independent system variable is an outer term;
iii. a time variable is an outer term, such as t
1
;
iv. if tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
are outer terms and o is an operator of arity n, then o(tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
) is an outer term
such as t
1
+ .
The outer calculus consists of the following formulae:
i. if tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
are outer terms and r is a relation of arity n, then r(tr
1
; : : : ; tr
n
) is an outer formula,
such as t
1
+  > 100 ;
ii. an outer subproposition is an outer formula, such as (PTemp > 5000 ; 5 ; t);
iii. if p is an outer formula then so is :p, such as :t
1
+  > 100 ;
iv. if p; q are outer formulae then so is p ^ q , such as 8t (PTemp > 5000 ; 5 ; t) ^ :t
1
+  > 100 ;
v. if p is an outer formula, and v is a time independent system variable then 8v p is an outer formula
such as 8i ; t (PTemp > 5000 ; i ; t) ^ :t
1
+  > 100 ;
vi. if p is an outer formula, and t a time variable then 8tp is an outer formula such as 8i ; t(PTemp >
5000 ; i ; t) ^ :t
1
+  > 100 .
3.2 Semantics of ERTL
We now partially characterise the models of the systems through the interrelationship of the symbols and
strings of the syntax.
3.2.1 Type Correctness
If there are types associated with logical or system variables, we will expect a model to be type-consistent.
63.2.2 Minimal Models
Any model must contain the following objects:
i. N
1
, the positive integers.
ii. T  R
+
, the timeline. The timeline should be a total order, isomorphic to the usual total order on
(a subset of) the positive real numbers.
To aid the description of the semantics we will use the following notation: F
I
are inner formulae, F
O
are
outer formulae with similar notation for inner and outer terms: Tr
I
, Tr
O
, and inner and outer constants:
C
I
, C
O
. Tr
I
further partitions into Tr
i
I
and Tr
d
I
, these being time independent and time dependent
formulae, respectively. E is the collection of event constants; A is the collection of action constants.
Unless otherwise necessary we will assume that all sets are pairwise disjoint.
3.2.3 Occurrence and Holding Relations and their Interrelation
i. An occurrence relation is a subset of (E  T ) [ (E  N
1
 T ) such that the following indexing
conditions hold:
8t (e; 1 ; t) , (e; t) ^ 8t
1
 0  t
1
< t ) :(e; t
1
)
8i ; t (e; i + 1 ; t) , (e; t) ^ 9t
1
 t
1
< t
^ (e; i ; t
1
) ^ 8t
2
 t
1
< t
2
< t ) :(e; t
2
)
and such that the following monotonicity conditions hold:
8i ; t ; t
0
 [(e; i ; t) ^ (e; i ; t
0
)] ) t = t
0
8i ; t (e; i + 1 ; t) ) [9t
0
(e; i ; t
0
) ^ t
0
< t ]
Each action a must have non-zero duration but be bounded above:
8i ; t ; t
0
("a; i ; t) ^ (#a; i ; t
0
) ) t < t
0
8i ; t ("a; i ; t) ) 9t
0
(#a; i ; t
0
)
ii. A holding relation is a subset of ((F
I
[ A)  T ) [ ((F
I
[ A)  N
1
 T ) such that the following
monotonicity conditions hold:
8i ; t
1
; t
2
(f ; i ; t
1
) ^ (f ; i ; t
2
) ) 8t  t
1
 t  t
2
) (f ; i ; t)
8i ; i
0
; t (f ; i ; t) ^ (f ; i
0
; t) ) i = i
0
and such that, if f , g are inner formulae, then
8t (:f ; t) , :(f ; t)
8t (f ^ g ; t) , (f ; t) ^ (g ; t)
8t (8v  f ; t) , 8v (f ; t)
and if f is time independent then
f , 8t (f ; t)
The latter collection of four properties of a holding relation are the `strong relationship' between the
outer and inner calculus mentioned above; they allow the migration of logical connectives appearing
in a formula, and time independent formulae, between calculi.
iii. Holding and occurrence relations are related thus:
8t (%f ; t)
, (f ; t) ^ (t = 0 _ 9t
1
 t
1
< t ^ 8t
2
 t
1
 t
2
< t ) :(f ; t
2
))
_ :(f ; t) ^ 9t
1
 t
1
> t ^ 8t
2
 t < t
2
 t
1
) (f ; t
2
)
8t (&f ; t)
, :(f ; t) ^ (t = 0 _ 9t
1
 t
1
< t ^ 8t
2
 t
1
 t
2
< t ) (f ; t
2
))
_ (f ; t) ^ 9t
1
 t
1
> t ^ 8t
2
 t < t
2
 t
1
) :(f ; t
2
)
7iv. There are indexing conditions for  as well:
8i ; t (f ; i ; t)
, (f ; t) ^ 9t
1
 t (%f ; i ; t
1
) ^ 8t
2
 t
2
< t ) :(&f ; i + 
f
; t
2
)
where

f
=

0 (f ; 0 )
1 :(f ; 0 )
this being shorthand for considering the initial value of the formula.
In order for ERTL to be compatible with RTL, in the axioms of items iii and iv above, we postulate the
occurrence of a transition event at time 0 . This is captured by the existance of a disjunction with (t = 0 )
at the righ hand side of both axioms of item iii. Whether it is a start (%f ; t) or a stop (&f ; t)
transition event, depends on whether the initial condition is assumed to be true or false, respectively.
4 Case Studies
To clarify the ERTL concepts introduced so far, in the following we present two hybrid systems case
studies: the cat and mouse problem, and temperature control of a nuclear reactor.
4.1 Cat and Mouse
A sleeping cat is awakened just in time to catch a eeing mouse [7]. The mouse and the cat both
move along a straight line towards the mouse hole, where the mouse will be safe. The mouse starts
running from a certain position mp
0
(left of the origin) with the velocity mv , and at the same time the
cat starts running from a certain position cp
0
with velocity cv . The problem is, will the cat catch the
mouse? The cat and mouse are regarded as being point objects (assumed to be capable of instantaneous
acceleration/deceleration).
4.1.1 System Model
In the following we model the cat and mouse system in terms of its variables, constants, physical laws,
assumptions and initial conditions. The system variables and constants are presented in the tab:1.
Name Type Comments
cp  0 cat position
mp  0 mouse position
cp
0
> 0 initial cat position
mp
0
> 0 initial mouse position
cv > 0 constant cat velocity, moving to right
mv > 0 constant mouse velocity, moving to right
Table 1: System variables and constants of the cat and mouse system
The only physical law of the system states that, if the velocity _p of an arbitrary object remains constant
then the distance travelled by the object from time t
1
to time t
2
is equal to the product of _p and the
dierence between t
2
and t
1
,
8t
1
; t
2
; p
1
; p
2
(p = p
1
; t
1
) ^ (p = p
2
; t
2
)) p
2
  p
1
= _p(t
2
  t
1
):
To simplify the modelling of the cat and mouse system, the following assumptions establish the permitted
range of velocities for the cat and mouse.
8i. The cat is either at rest or moving with a constant velocity in the positive x direction:
8t ( _cp = 0 _ _cp = cv ; t):
ii. The mouse is either at rest or moving with a constant velocity in the positive x direction:
8t ( _mp = 0 _ _mp = mv ; t):
The initial conditions establish the initial positions of the cat and mouse, and their relative initial posi-
tions.
i. The initial position of the cat is cp
0
units to the left of the origin:
(cp =  cp
0
; 0 ):
ii. The initial position of the mouse is mp
0
units to the left of the origin:
(mp =  mp
0
; 0 ):
iii. Initially, the cat is farther away from the origin than the mouse:
( cp
0
<  mp
0
):
4.1.2 Finish Conditions
To establish the nish conditions we introduce the following two events which characterise whether the
cat or the mouse wins:
i. The cat wins if it catches the mouse before the cat reaches the origin:
8t  [(CatWon; t), (cp = mp; t) ^ :(cp = 0 ; t)]:
ii. The mouse is safe if it reaches the origin before the cat catches it up:
8t  [(MouseSafe; t), (mp = 0 ; t) ^ 8t
1
 t
1
< t ) :(mp = cp; t
1
)]:
4.1.3 Analysis
In the followingwe identify the conditions under which the two nishing situations may occur. To conduct
the analysis we introduce a constant which relates the positions of the cat and the mouse, at particular
time points.
The behaviour of the cat and mouse can be described by the physical law in combination with initial
conditions to give
8t ; b  (cp =  cp
0
; 0 ) ^ (cp = b; t)) b + cp
0
= cv :t ;
8t ; b  (mp =  mp
0
; 0 ) ^ (mp = b; t)) b +mp
0
= mv :t :
Considering the nish condition for when the mouse is safe, we infer from the second of the above physical
laws the following condition for the mouse to escape
8t  (mp = 0 ; t)) t = mp
0
=mv :
However, for the mouse to escape, the positions of the cat and the mouse should never be equal
8t
1
 (mp = cp; t
1
)) t
1
= (mp
0
  cp
0
)=(mv   cv):
9For t
1
to be positive, we require that mv   cv < 0 . Equating the original nish condition, for the mouse
to be safe, in terms of the above two conditions, we obtain
8t  (MouseSafe; t), t = mp
0
=mv ^ 8t
1
 t
1
< t ) t
1
6= (mp
0
  cp
0
)=(mv   cv):
So that the mouse is safe given
mp
0
=mv  (mp
0
  cp
0
)=(mv   cv)
or, as mv   cv < 0 than
mp
0
=mv  cp
0
=cv :
4.2 Controlling the Temperature of a Nuclear Reactor
The case study involves a system used to control the temperature of the coolant of a nuclear reactor by
moving a control rod. The following case study is a modied version of the case study presented in [6].
The dierences are as follows:
 Whereas in [6] two subsystems control the position of the rods, and a manager coordinates the
actions of both subsystems, in this paper we consider only one of the subsystems, and specify its
activities in terms of the requirements and constraints imposed by physics of the real-world [3].
 Instead of illustrating the ability of RTL to deal with the modelling of distributed systems, we
emphasize the ability of ERTL of modelling the environment in which the computer system is to
be embedded. For that the temperature of the coolant is explicitly modelled, and we assume that
the rate of change of temperature is dependent on the position of the control rods.
The approach adopted for the modelling and analysis of the system, broadly matches the approach
adopted in [1, 2], which aims to obtain a formal model of the interface between the computing system
and its environment, thus establishing the requirements specication of the computing system to be
designed.
For the presentation of this case study, we initially dene the model of the system which provides the
basis for conducting the analysis, and then we specify the safety requirement to be associated with the
system and the respective control strategy necessary to maintain the safe behaviour. Finally, we conduct
a formal analysis of the circumstances under which the safety requirement is maintained by the control
strategy. Three dierent approaches to the formal analysis are presented, these vary on the extent to
which they exploit the information available in the system model.
4.3 System Model
The model of the system is described next, in terms of the system variables and constants, physical laws
and rules of operation, and the initial conditions of the system.
4.3.1 System Variables
The system variables and the constants are described in tab:2.
4.3.2 Abbreviations
Abbreviations simplify certain, more complex, syntactic entities to allow the expression of more simple
formal models of the system. To be able to formally manipulate the position of the rod more easily, we
dene predicates MovRod(d), for d 2 fup; downg, such that:
10
Constants
Constants Range Comments Unit
KRate R
+
The proportionality constant between the position
of a rod and the rate of change of the temperature.
o
K=cm s
UpRate R
+
The rate at which the rod moves up. cm=s
DownRate R
 
The rate at which the rod moves down. cm=s
StablePos R
+
The position at which the temperature is stable,
minPos < StablePos < maxPos.
cm
 R
+
The distance moved by the rod in one step. cm
minPos R
+
The minimum position of the control rod, which
is an integer multiple of .
cm
maxPos R
+
The maximum position of the control rod, which
is an integer multiple of .
cm
minTemp R
+
The minimum temperature of the coolant.
o
K
maxTemp R
+
The maximum temperature of the coolant.
o
K
maxDecrease R
 
The maximum rate at which the temperature of
the coolant can decrease.
o
K=s
maxIncrease R
+
The maximum rate at which the temperature of
the coolant can increase.
o
K=s
minReq R
+
The minimumoperating temperature at which the
rod can remain stationary indenitely.
o
K
maxReq R
+
The maximum operating temperature at which
the rod can remain stationary indenitely.
o
K
maxSafe R
+
The maximum safe operating temperature.
o
K
IT R
+
Initial temperature, between minReq andmaxReq .
o
K
IP R
+
Initial position of the rod, between minPos and
maxPos, is an integer multiple of .
cm
System Variables
Variables Range Comments Unit
Temp R
+
Temperature of the coolant,
minTemp  Temp  maxTemp
o
K
_
Temp R The rate of change of the temperature of the
coolant,
minDecrease 
_
Temp  maxIncrease
o
K=s
PosRod R
+
The vertical position of the control rod,
minPos  PosRod  maxPos
cm
_
PosRod R The rate of change of the position of the rod,
_
PosRod 2 fDownRate; 0 ;UpRateg
cm=s
Table 2: System variables and constants of the nuclear reactor system
11
i. MovRod(up) ,
_
PosRod > 0 :
ii. MovRod(down) ,
_
PosRod < 0 :
MovRod(up), MovRod(down) and
_
PosRod = 0 partition true.
4.3.3 Physical Laws and Rules of Operation
The physical laws describe the continuous behaviour of the system.
i. A quantity whose rate is constant varies linearly over time:
8t  _s(t) = K ) (8t
1
; t
2
; u
1
; u
2
(s = u
1
; t
1
) ^ (s = u
2
; t
2
)) u
2
  u
1
= K (t
2
  t
1
)):
ii. A quantity whose rate is linear varies quadratically over time:
8t  _s(t) = K
1
:t +K
2
)
(8t
1
; t
2
; u
1
; u
2
(s = u
1
; t
1
) ^ (s = u
2
; t
2
)) u
2
  u
1
= K
1
(t
2
2
  t
2
1
)=2 + K
2
(t
2
  t
1
)):
iii. A quantity whose rate is bounded in an interval is bounded by the length of the interval times the
maximum rate:
Z
b
a
f (x ) dx  [b   a] max
x2[a;b]
f (x ):
The rules of operation describe the discrete behaviour of the system.
i. The rate of temperature increase depends (linearly) on the height of the control rod:
8t (
_
Temp = KRate:(PosRod   StablePos); t):
ii. The rod moves at a constant velocity between xed positions at rate UpRate or DownRate:
8t (9n  PosRod = n: _
_
PosRod = DownRate _
_
PosRod = UpRate; t):
iii. The minimum position of the rod is an integer multiple of :
9n
min
minPos = n
min
::
iv. The maximum position of the rod is an integer multiple of :
9n
max
maxPos = n
max
::
v. The rod takes precisely 20 units of time to move between xed positions:
8t
1
; i ; d (%MovRod(d); i ; t
1
)) (&MovRod(d); i + 1 ; t
1
+ 20 ):
vi. The rod remains stationary for at least 10 units of time between consecutive movements:
8t
1
; i (&9d MovRod(d); i ; t
1
) ^ (%9d MovRod(d); i ; t
2
)) t
2
 t
1
+ 10 :
vii. When the rod is at its minimum position it may only move up:
8t ; d (PosRod = minPos; t) ^ (%MovRod(d); t)) d = up:
viii. When the rod is at its maximum position it may only move down:
8t ; d (PosRod = maxPos; t) ^ (%MovRod(d); t)) d = down:
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4.3.4 Initial Conditions
The initial conditions dene the state of the system at time 0 .
i. The value of the temperature is between minReq and maxReq :
(Temp = IT ; 0 ) ^ minReq  IT  maxReq :
ii. The rod is stationary:
(
_
PosRod = 0 ; 0 ):
iii. The rod has a position which is an integer multiple of :
(PosRod = IP ; 0 ) ^ 9n  IP = n: ^ minPos  IP  maxPos:
4.4 Safety Requirement
A safety requirement is a condition imposed on the system, if violated might breach the safe behaviour
of the system. The safety requirement of the system that we consider for this case study is that the
temperature of the coolant should never breach the maximum safe operating temperature. This may be
expressed as:
8t (Temp  maxSafe; t)
4.5 Control Strategy
A control strategy is a way of maintaining safe behaviour, and is dened as a set of conditions, in terms
of controllable factors, over the system.
i. If the temperature has reached the maximum required temperature maxReq and the rod is allowed
to move, then the rod must start to move down:
8t (Temp  maxReq ; t)
^ (8t
0
 t   10  t
0
 t ) (:9d MovRod(d); t
0
))
) (%MovRod(down); t)
ii. If the temperature has reached the minimum required temperature minReq and the rod is allowed
to move, then the rod must start to move up: afterwards:
8t (Temp  minReq ; t)
^ (8t
0
 t   10  t
0
 t ) (:9d MovRod(d); t
0
))
) (%MovRod(up); t)
From the system model and control strategies, we should be able to prove formally that the safety
requirement is always maintained.
4.6 Formal Analysis
In the following we present the main steps of the formal analysis, which has shown that the safety
requirement is always maintained for the specied system model and control strategy. After establishing
the condition for maintaining the safety requirement, we have developed three distinct system models,
from which we are able to determine dierent values for the maximum required temperature maxReq
depending on the accuracy of the adopted system model.
The main steps of the formal analysis are aas follows:
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Figure 1: An instance of the control strategy in the worst case for N (the maximum number of steps
required to reach StablePos) is 3
i. The initial step is to demonstrate that, if the supremum of the temperatures at which the rate of
change of the temperature is non-positive is greater than or equal to maxReq , then the temperature
can be bounded. This can be shown by applying the control strategy i . In fact, by analysis we may
produce a bound on the number of steps it takes for
_
Temp to become negative.
ii. In the second step, we demonstrate that the maximum number of whole steps that is required for
the rate of change of temperature to become non-positive is N = d(maxPos   StablePos)=e + 1 .
iii. In the third step we identify the maximum time that is required for the rate of change of temper-
ature to become non-positive is DownTime = 30 + 20 :(maxPos   StablePos)= + 10 :b(maxPos  
StablePos)=c.
iv. In the last step, we show that If the initial temperature of the coolant is maxReq or below, then the
temperature is bounded above by
R
T
0
+DownTime
T
0
_
Temp dt+maxReq , where (Temp = maxReq ;T
0
).
Hence, we infer that the safety requirement follows from the system when for all T
0
:
Z
T
0
+DownTime
T
0
_
Temp dt < maxSafe  maxReq :
In the following, we now give the analysis of the integral in increasing detail in terms of three distinct
system models. Models 1 and 2 give pessimistic estimates of the integral, being Model 2 better than that
of Model 1. Model 3 gives a more accurate value. From these we may assign values to the constants
parametrising the system for which the formal system is satisable.
4.6.1 Model 1
Our rst estimate of the maximum value of the integrand, i.e.,
_
Temp, over a range will be the maximum
value it attains over that interval. Hence, from range of PosRod and rule of operation i :
8t 2 [T
0
;T
0
+ DownTime] (
_
Temp
 KRate:(maxPos   StablePos); t):
Therefore, from the estimate given by Model 1, the system is safe if
DownTime:KRate:(maxPos   StablePos) < maxSafe  maxReq :
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4.6.2 Model 2
Our second estimate is more accurate: by subdividing the interval and estimating the value within the
interval as the maximum value attained during that interval. Hence, from the rules of operation i , v and
vi :
8t 2 [T
0
;T
0
+ 20 ] (
_
Temp  KRate:(maxPos   StablePos); t):
and, given that our intervals begin with the period when the rod is stationary
8i 2 f1 ; : : : ;N   1g
8t 2 [T
0
+ i :30   10 ;T
0
+ i :30 + 20 ]
(
_
Temp  KRate:(maxPos   (i   1 ):  StablePos); t):
Therefore, from the estimate given by Model 2, the system is safe if
20 :KRate:(maxPos   StablePos)
+
P
N 1
i=1
30 :KRate:(maxPos   (i   1 ):  StablePos) < maxSafe  maxReq :
4.6.3 Model 3
The precise value of the temperature at the end of the interval is given by evaluating the integral. Hence,
from the rules of operation i , v and vi :
8t 2 [T
0
;T
0
+ 20 ] (
_
Temp = KRate:(maxPos    StablePos + UpRate:(t  T
0
)); t)
8i 2 f1 ; : : : ;N   1g
8t 2 [T
0
+ 30 :i   10 ;T
0
+ 30 :i ] (
_
Temp = KRate:(maxPos   (i   1 ):  StablePos); t)
8i 2 f1 ; : : : ;N   2g
8t 2 [T
0
+ 30 :i ;T
0
+ 30 :i + 20 ]
(
_
Temp = KRate:(maxPos   (i   1 ):  StablePos + DownRate:(t   T
0
  30 :i)); t)
8t 2 [T
0
+ 30 :(N   1 );T
0
+ 30 :StablePos=]
(
_
Temp = KRate:(maxPos   (N   2 ):  StablePos + DownRate:(t   T
0
  30 :(N   1 ))); t)
so that the system is safe if
20 :KRate:(maxPos    StablePos + 10 :UpRate)
+
P
N 1
i=1
10 :KRate:(maxPos   (i   1 ):  StablePos)
+
P
N 2
i=1
20 :KRate:(maxPos   (i   1 ):  StablePos + 10 :UpRate)
+20 :KRate:(maxPos   (N   2 ):  StablePos + UpRate:(StablePos=)
2
=2 )
< maxSafe  maxReq
5 Conclusions
Instead of proposing a novel formal technique for hybrid systems, in this paper we have presented an
approach based on an extension of RTL which is an established formal technique. The proposed extensions
are relatively straightfoward, allowing ERTL to be used in the modelling and analysis of hybrid systems,
particularly for the stage of requirements analysis.
ERTL is in its early stage of development, and a richer proof theory than that provided by the axioms is
being sought. This will, in the usual way, be built upon the identication of useful predicates within the
logic, and their interrelation. Initial experimentation with JAPE (Just Another Proof Editor) has shown
the diculty of proof from rst principles, so such extensions are to be considered necessary for a usable
formalism.
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